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Abstract  
Helping others at no cost to oneself is a simple way 
to demonstrate other-regarding preferences. Yet, pri-
mates exhibit mixed results for other-regarding pref-
erences: chimpanzees and tamarins do not show these 
effects, whereas capuchin monkeys and marmosets 
preferentially give food to others. One factor of rele-
vance to this no-cost food donation is the payoff to the 
donor. Though donors always receive the same pay-
offs regardless of their choice, previous work varies in 
whether they receive either a food reward or no food re-
ward. Here, I tested cotton-top tamarins in a preferen-
tial giving task. Subjects could choose from two tools, 
one of which delivered food to a partner in an adjacent 
cage and the other of which delivered food to an empty 
cage. Thus, subjects could preferentially give or with-
hold food from a partner. I varied whether subjects re-
ceived food payoffs, whether a partner was present or 
absent, and whether the partner was a non-cagemate 
or the subject’s mate. Results showed that the subjects’ 
overall motivation to pull either tool declined when 
they did not receive any food. Additionally, they did 
not preferentially donate or withhold food, regardless of 
their own payoff or their relationship with the partner. 
Thus, cotton-top tamarins do not take advantage of cost-
free food giving, either when they might gain in the fu-
ture (mates) or when they have no opportunity for fu-
ture interactions (non-cagemates). 
Keywords: altruism, callitrichid, cooperative breeding, 
inequity, payoff, self-interest 
Introduction
Self-interest lies at the heart of evolutionary and eco-
nomic views of decision making. Evolutionary analy-
ses of behavior predict that altruism (helping others at 
an expense to one’s own fitness) will not spread through 
a population because non-altruists will have higher fit-
ness. Behaviors that appear altruistic actually result in 
return benefits through various mechanisms such as 
reciprocity, kin selection, reputation formation, or pun-
ishment (Dugatkin 1997). Similarly, economic models 
assume that decision makers focusing on self-interest 
will outcompete altruists in the marketplace. In classical 
economic theory, an individual’s utility function does 
not include payoffs to others (von Neumann and Mor-
genstern 1947). However, a rich literature in behavioral 
economics demonstrates that humans, in fact, do behave 
in ways that benefit others (Camerer 2003). Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) present a model in which, rather than fo-
cusing exclusively on the payoffs to self, the outcomes 
of other agents factor into the utility functions of indi-
viduals. Once decision makers include the payoffs of 
others in their utility functions, they should attend to 
the outcomes of others and demonstrate “other-regard-
ing preferences”. 
Recently, comparative psychologists have applied the 
behavioral economic framework, including a regard for 
the outcome of others, to non-human animals, especially 
primates. A study of cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedi-
pus) showed that individuals spontaneously gave food 
to another unrelated individual in repeated reciprocity 
games, although this sharing decreased over time (Chen 
and Hauser 2005; Hauser et al. 2003). In addition, the 
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tamarins rarely gave food to pure defectors, suggesting 
that any giving that occurred likely did not result from a 
general propensity to help others. 
One way to test for other-regarding preferences in 
a more straightforward manner is to remove the costs 
associated with helping others. Stevens and Stephens 
(2004) tested this in blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) by al-
lowing them to give food to another individual at no 
cost to themselves. In this situation, individual subjects 
gave food in over 70% of the trials, whereas in a situ-
ation with a cost to cooperating (Prisoner’s Dilemma), 
they gave food in less than 40% of the trials. Early work 
on cost-free generosity in primates, however, failed to 
show other-regarding preferences. Chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes), one of the most cooperative primate species 
(de Waal 2003; Melis et al. 2006a, b; Muller and Mitani 
2005), did not demonstrate any regard for the food pay-
offs of other individuals. In two different tasks, chim-
panzees could choose one of two options. Both options 
resulted in food rewards for the chooser, but only one 
option provided food to a partner. Chimpanzees failed 
to preferentially choose the option that delivered food 
to the partner when compared to a condition with no 
partner present (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk 
et al. 2008). 
Experiments with New World monkeys, however, 
have provided stronger evidence of other-regarding 
preferences. For example, in a study modeled after Silk 
et al. (2005), Burkart and colleagues (2007) showed that 
common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) preferentially 
gave food to a partner when facing no cost. The authors 
proposed that cooperative breeding has provided a 
strong evolutionary force shaping other-regarding pref-
erences, and this explains why marmosets and humans 
(Burkart and van Schaik 2009; Hrdy 2005) show these 
preferences but chimpanzees do not. This interpretation 
is, however, weakened based on the evidence that ca-
puchin monkeys also show other-regarding preferences 
in similar tasks (de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan 
and Santos 2008). Thus, cooperative breeding is not nec-
essary for the evolution of other-regarding preferences. 
To further complicate the comparative data thus far and 
erode the significance of cooperative breeding, Cronin et 
al. (2009) conducted a similar test with the cooperatively 
breeding cotton-top tamarin, a New World monkey that 
shares many life history and anatomical traits with com-
mon marmosets. Tamarins failed to preferentially give 
food to their partners even with no cost, leading the au-
thors to reject cooperative breeding as a sufficient factor 
in the evolution of other-regarding preferences. 
One important aspect of other-regarding prefer-
ences is the role of food rewards for the potential donor. 
Though donors always receive the same payoffs regard-
less of their choice, the studies mentioned here vary in 
whether the donor receives a food payoff (Table 1). In 
some studies, subjects chose between (1, 0) and (1, 1) 
(payoff to donor, payoff to recipient), whereas in oth-
ers, the donor received no payoff, instead choosing be-
tween (0, 0) versus (0, 1). Jensen et al. (2006) and Cronin 
et al. (2009) offered both types of donor payoffs and but 
across different experiments.
The present study investigates how the payoff to the 
donor influences his or her motivation to give food to 
the partner. To directly compare the effect of donor pay-
off on other-regarding preferences, I offered subjects 
both (1, 0) versus (1, 1) and (0, 0) versus (0, 1) choices in 
the same sessions. In addition, I compared a social con-
dition to a non-social condition to control for the role of 
the presence of the partner. I also presented tamarins 
with an opportunity to give food when paired with ei-
ther a genetically unrelated individual from a different 
group or their mate. Together, these factors explore how 
donor payoffs and partner relationships influence other-
regarding preferences. 
Materials and Methods
Subjects
I tested five cotton-top tamarins (two males) as sub-
jects (ID, PB, EN, RB, SH) and seven tamarins (four 
males) as partners (ID, PB, RW, SP, EM, EN, RB). All 
subjects were adults (4–9 years old) housed at the Cog-
nitive Evolution Laboratory at Harvard University and 
tested from June–November 2003. All subjects had par-
ticipated in previous experiments, including a previ-
ous cooperation experiment (Hauser et al. 2003). In the 
first phase of the experiment, subjects were paired with 
non-cagemates of the opposite sex. Four subjects acted 
as non-cagemate partners for other subjects. In the sec-
ond phase of the experiment, each subject was paired 
with his or her mate. 
Apparatus
Experimenters lured subjects from their home cage to a 
transport cage with a raisin, and from the transport cage 
to a testing apparatus in a separate room. The apparatus 
consisted of three adjacent cages, each measuring ap-
proximately 30 × 30 × 30 cm (Figure 1a). The fronts of 
the cages were constructed from transparent Plexiglas 
panels, whereas the remaining sides were constructed 
from metal wire. The Plexiglas panels included doors 
with either one hole (side cages) or two holes (center 
cage). The experimenter placed the focal subject in the 
center cage and, for paired conditions, placed partners 
in a randomly chosen side cage. Removable transparent 
Plexiglas barriers separated the cages. 
The experimenter placed two 45 × 35 cm Plexiglas 
trays in front of the cages. Each tray included a small 
aluminum shelf stretching the width of the tray, with 
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each end connected to a ball-bearing drawer slide. An 
acrylic handle was attached to each tray aligned with 
the holes in the subject’s cage. Pulling the handle slid 
the shelf toward the subject and the adjacent cage. 
Experimental procedure
All trials began with a transparent Plexiglas barrier pre-
venting the subject from reaching the two handles. To 
begin a trial, the experimenter placed marshmallows on 
the metal shelf in the location determined by the trial 
type (see below and Figure 1b–e). The experimenter first 
placed the two sets of marshmallows in front of the sub-
ject (‘inside’ position) then in front of the partner (‘out-
side’ position). If the condition required no marshmal-
lows in a given location, the experimenter simulated 
placing marshmallows there using the same movements 
in all trials. This avoided signaling the condition to the 
subjects, forcing them to attend to the distribution of 
food. After placing the food, the experimenter removed 
the front barrier, and the subject had 3 s to attempt to 
pull the handle and 30 s to get the food. If the subject did 
not touch the handle within 3 s or retrieve the food after 
30 s, the experimenter replaced the barrier and recorded 
the failure. Choice was measured as the first touch of a 
handle. After touching a handle, the experimenter slid 
the non-chosen handle out of reach. After the subject ob-
tained the food, the experimenter drew the handle back 
to the initial position, replaced the barrier, and removed 
any unconsumed food. 
Trial types, conditions, sessions, and phases
Subjects experienced four different trial types within ev-
ery session (Figure 1b–e). In the “Self and Other” trials, 
the experimenter placed one marshmallow on each tray 
Table 1. Food distributions and outcomes for previous experiments with nonkin 
Study Species Food distribution Donation rate        Partner present/ 
             absent difference
Silk et al. 2005  Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)       
   Lousiana  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.56 0.02
   Texas  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.48 0.00
Jensen et al. 2006  Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)       
   Experiment 1  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.87a  0.01
   Experiment 2  (0, 0) vs. (0, 1) 0.20a  0.03
   Experiment 3  (0, 0) vs. (0, 1) 0.08a  0.04
Vonk et al. 2008  Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)       
   Experiment 2  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.48 0.05
Burkart et al. 2007  Common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus)       
   Cagemates/related  (0, 0) vs. (0, 1) 0.55a  0.10a 
   Unrelated  (0, 0) vs. (0, 1) 0.60a  0.20a 
de Waal et al. 2008  Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)       
   Nonkin-1 and -2  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.62–0.65a, b  No absent condition
   Kin  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.73a, b  No absent condition
   Stranger  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.46b  No absent condition
   Nonkin inequity  (L, 0) vs. (L, H)c  0.53 No absent condition
   Kin inequity  (L, 0) vs. (L, H)c  0.58 No absent condition
Lakshminarayanan  Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)  (H, L) vs. (H, H)c  0.62a, d  0.08a, d  
    and Santos 2008   (L, L) vs. (L, H)c  0.62a, d  0.08a, d 
Cronin et al. 2009  Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)      
   Experiment 1  (1, 0) vs. (1, 1) 0.56a  0.04
   Experiment 2  (0, 0) vs. (0, 1) 0.33a  0.03
Means are taken directly from text or estimated from figures
a. Differs from chance (0.50 for donation rate and 0.0 for partner present/absent difference) at α = 0.05 
b. Excludes data on individuals with side bias 
c.  H  high preferred reward (grape for de Waal et al. 2008, marshmallow for Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008), L low pre-
ferred reward (apple for de Waal et al. 2008, celery for Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008) 
d. Though both conditions were conducted, performance did not differ across conditions, so only pooled mean was given in the 
text
666 Jef f r e y r. Stev en S i n Ani m A l Cog n i ti on 13 (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in front of the subject and three marshmallows in both 
of the outside locations. Three marshmallows were used 
in the outside position to maximize the subject’s inter-
est in those payoffs. In the “Other Only” trials, the ex-
perimenter placed three marshmallows in both of the 
outside locations but no marshmallows in front of the 
subject on the inside tray. The “Right Only” and “Left 
Only” trials presented the same one versus three marsh-
mallow distribution as in Self and Other, but only on the 
right or left side of the apparatus. The one versus three 
design set up an inequity between partners, to which I 
return in the Discussion. 
Subjects experienced three conditions. In the Partner 
Absent/Barrier condition, only the subject was tested 
with both cage barriers in place. In the Partner Absent/
No Barrier condition, only the subject was tested with 
one of the cage barriers removed, such that the subject 
could access food in both the inside and outside posi-
tions for that tray. In the Partner Present condition, 
the subject was tested with the partner placed in a ran-
domly chosen side cage, and with the transparent bar-
riers in place so that the tamarins could see each other, 
but not physically interact. 
All sessions consisted of 14 trials. To facilitate the 
subject’s ability to discriminate the different payoffs, the 
trial types followed a fixed order within a session. The 
first two trials were Right Only and Left Only trials, ran-
domly ordered. The next four trials were Other Only tri-
als, and the final eight trials were Self and Other trials. 
For the Self and Other trials in the Partner Absent/No 
Barrier condition, the side with the barrier was switched 
after four trials, so subjects had to track which side of-
fered the highest payoffs. 
For each of two phases (see below), subjects com-
pleted 10 replicates of the following series of sessions: 
a Partner Absent/Barrier session, then a Partner Ab-
sent/No Barrier session, then a Partner Present session. 
To pass a Partner Absent session, the subjects must have 
chosen correctly for all Right Only and Left Only trials. 
In no barrier sessions, they must have made no more 
than one mistake (meaning pulling the handle that de-
livers food behind barrier) in all Self and Other trials 
and Other Only trials. In barrier sessions, subjects could 
pull on no more than one Other Only trial but could pull 
either side on Self and Other trials. If a subject did not 
pass a session, it was repeated until the subject passed. 
In the first phase, subjects were paired with unrelated 
partners from another cage (non-cagemates). In the sec-
ond phase, subjects were paired with their mates. 
Predictions
If the tamarins have other-regarding preferences, 
they should preferentially pull the tool that gives food 
to their partner in both the Other Only and the Self and 
Other trials in the Partner Present condition. If they do 
not have other-regarding preferences, then they should 
pull the two tools at chance levels. It is also possible 
that they either act spitefully or perceive the payoffs as 
asymmetric, and then they may preferentially pull the 
tool associated with the empty cage. In addition, if the 
tamarins are motivated by altruism, then they should 
pull the tool more often for Other Only trials in the Part-
ner Present condition compared to the Partner Absent/
Barrier condition. If, however, they do not show a dif-
ference in these conditions, this suggests that they either 
do not attend to or care about rewards for others. If the 
presence or absence of a payoff for themselves does not 
influence their decisions, they should donate equally 
frequently in the Other Only and Self and Other trials 
in the Partner Present condition. Finally, if they under-
stand the apparatus and situation, they should preferen-
tially pull for the open compartment in both the Other 
Only and the Self and Other trials in the Partner Ab-
sent/No Barrier condition. I use a significance level of 
α = 0.05 to test these predictions. 
Results
In the non-cagemate phase, the tamarins pulled one of 
the two tools in almost every trial for all treatments in 
Figure 1. Apparatus and trial types. a) The apparatus consisted of 
three adjacent cages and two trays with handles accessible to the cen-
ter cage. From the center cage, the subject could pull one of the two 
handles to deliver food to him- or herself and to either a partner or an 
empty cage. b) In Self and Other trials, food was placed in all four pos-
sible positions. Pulling the trays delivered food to self and to either the 
partner or an empty cage. c) In Other Only trials, food was placed only 
in the outside positions, so pulling the tray only delivered food to the 
partner or the empty cage. d) and e) In Right Only and Left Only tri-
als, food was placed on only one of the two trays. 
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which food was available for them (Figure 2a). When 
food was not available for them (Other Only trials in 
Partner Absent/Barrier and Partner Present conditions), 
the mean (±95% CI) proportion of trials in which sub-
jects pulled one of the two tools (overall pull rate pooled 
over subject means) dropped to 0.10 ± 0.11 in the Partner 
Absent/Barrier condition and 0.21 ± 0.19 in the Partner 
Present condition. They did not pull differently across 
these two conditions (paired t-test: t 4 = 0.69, P = 0.53, 
h = 0.31), indicating that the presence or absence of a 
partner did not influence their pulling. In the Partner 
Present condition, they pulled much less when they did 
not receive food, suggesting that donor payoffs greatly 
influenced their choice. 
To investigate preferential food giving, I measured 
the proportion of trials in which the subject pulled the 
tray nearest the partner (number of pulls for partner/
total number of pulls), looking for a departure from 
chance performance of 0.50 (Figure 2b). For Self and 
Other trials in the Partner Present condition, the mean 
proportion of pulls for the non-cagemate partner was 
0.50 ± 0.06, which did not differ from that expected by 
chance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 4 = 0.11, P = 0.92, 
h = 0.01). The proportion of pulls for the partner did 
not differ in the first and last five sessions (first half: 
0.47 ± 0.07, second half: 0.54 ± 0.07). In Other Only tri-
als in which subjects pulled one of the tools (only 21% 
of the trials), they preferentially pulled for their partner 
0.56 ± 0.38 of the time, again, not differing from chance 
performance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 4 = 0.41, 
P = 0.70, h = 0.11) and not differing from the Self and 
Other trials (paired t-test: t 4 = 0.40, P = 0.71, h = 0.11). 
Thus, the subjects did not preferentially give food to 
their non-cagemate partners in the presence or absence 
of reward for themselves; when they did not receive 
food (Other Only trials), they rarely pulled at all. 
To ensure that they understood the apparatus, I com-
pared the Self and Other trials to the Other Only trials 
in the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition. The sub-
jects correctly pulled the handle that delivered food to 
the adjacent compartment in almost every trial (Self and 
Other: 0.99 ± 0.02, Other Only: 0.96 ± 0.02; Figure 2b), in-
dicating that they understood the apparatus. 
In the cagemate phase, the overall pull rate was sim-
ilar to the non-cagemate phase, with high pulling rates 
only for conditions in which food was available to the 
Figure 2. Pattern of pulling across con-
ditions. a) Tamarins pulled one of the 
two tools in almost 100% of the trials in 
all conditions except the Other Only tri-
als in both the Partner Absent/Barrier 
and Partner Present conditions. Pull-
ing did not differ across these two con-
ditions. b) To investigate whether the 
subjects preferentially pulled one of the 
tools, a ‘correct’ pull was defined differ-
ently depending on the condition. In the 
Partner Absent/Barrier condition, there 
is no partner present, and the subject 
cannot access either adjacent compart-
ment. Since there is no correct response 
in this condition, pulling the right tool 
was randomly chosen as a correct re-
sponse. In the Partner Absent/No Bar-
rier condition, no partner was placed in 
the adjacent cage, but one of the barriers 
was removed to give access to the adja-
cent compartments. Thus, a correct pull 
was one which delivered food to the side 
with no barrier. In the Partner Present 
condition, a partner was present in one 
of the two adjacent compartments. Here, 
the trials in which the subject pulled the 
tool delivering food to the partner were 
scored as a correct choice. Error bars rep-
resent 95% confidence intervals.
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subject and low pull rates (Other Only in Partner Ab-
sent/Barrier: 0.05 ± 0.04; Other Only in Partner Present: 
0.14 ± 0.12) otherwise (Figure 2a). Preferential pulling 
for the subjects’ mates in the Self and Other trials in the 
Partner Present condition was 0.55 ± 0.07, not differing 
from chance performance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 
4 = 2.00, P = 0.12, h = 0.10). The proportion of pulls for 
the partner did not differ in the first and last five ses-
sions (first half: 0.55 ± 0.15, second half: 0.56 ± 0.14). 
In the Other Only trials in the Partner Present con-
dition, subjects preferentially pulled for their mates 
in 0.36 ± 0.18 of the trials. Though subjects pulled less 
than expected by chance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 
3 = −2.48, P = 0.09, h = 0.29), this is based on very few tri-
als (28 of the 202 Other Only trials in the Partner Present 
condition) and is not a significant difference. Also, based 
on only a few trials, Other Only and Self and Other dif-
fer, although not significantly (paired t-test: t 3 = 2.79, 
P = 0.07, h = 0.39). Again, the subjects pulled correctly 
in the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition (Self and 
Other: 0.97 ± 0.07, Other Only: 0.92 ± 0.10; Figure 2b). 
Though subjects did not differ from chance in the 
Self and Other trials for either the non-cagemate or 
mate phases, a comparison of these two phases shows 
a significant difference (paired t-test: t 4 = 4.45, P = 0.01, 
h = 0.10). In particular, four out of five subjects pulled 
slightly more (mean difference = 0.05) for their mates 
than for non-cagemates (Table 2). 
Discussion
To summarize, the tamarins always pulled one of the 
tools when they received food but rarely pulled when 
they did not receive food. Thus, they treated the situa-
tion quite differently depending on their own payoffs: 
a payoff for the donor motivated higher pulling rates. 
When the subjects did pull the tool, however, they did 
not preferentially give food to or withhold food from 
their partners in any conditions. The comparison be-
tween the non-cagemate to mate conditions did show 
a statistically significant effect of giving food more to 
mates. This result suffers from two difficulties, how-
ever. First, the effect is quite small (0.50 vs. 0.56), likely 
too small to be biologically meaningful. Second, all sub-
jects in this experiment experienced the non-cagemate 
condition before the mate condition. Thus, it is possible 
that any differences between these two conditions could 
have resulted from the order in which they were expe-
rienced. The tamarins could have become more gener-
ous over time, biasing the later mate condition toward 
more generous behavior. Further tests with randomized 
ordering would address these issues. 
One drawback of this experiment is the use of one 
food item for the subject and three food items for the 
partner. Though I used these amounts to increase the 
attention of the subject to the partner’s payoff, this re-
sulted in an inequality in the payoff distribution. Like 
the literature on other-regarding preferences, research 
on primates’ ability to detect and respond to inequitable 
payoffs has resulted in conflicting accounts. Following 
Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) original study on capu-
chin monkeys, some studies have found that chimpan-
zees and capuchins demonstrate an aversion to inequity 
(Brosnan et al. 2005; van Wolkenten et al. 2007), whereas 
others have failed to find this effect in the same species 
(Bräuer et al. 2006; Dubreuil et al. 2006; Fontenot et al. 
2007; Roma et al. 2006; Silberberg et al. 2009), includ-
ing Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) male capuchin mon-
keys. If tamarins prefer equitable payoff distributions, 
this could explain why they did not preferentially give 
food in this experiment. This seems unlikely for two rea-
sons, however. First, previous tests of inequity aversion 
in cotton-top tamarins did not show an effect of ineq-
uitable payoffs to partners (Neiworth et al. 2009). Sec-
ond, if the tamarins wanted to avoid giving the larger 
amount to their partner, they should have preferentially 
withheld food from the partner. The tamarins exhibited 
complete indifference in their choices, however, sug-
gesting that they simply did not attend to the payoffs of 
their partner. Nevertheless, it is possible that observing 
the partner receiving a larger payoff reduced the moti-
vation of the subjects to the point that they became in-
different to the outcome of the partner. 
These data replicate the negative results of Cronin et 
al. (2009), with cotton-top tamarins not giving food to or 
withholding food from other individuals. Like Cronin et 
al., these results conflict with the cooperative breeding 
hypothesis of other-regarding preferences proposed by 
Burkart et al. (2007). In this paradigm, the Other Only 
condition is analogous to the (0, 1) against (0, 0) condi-
tion used by Burkart et al. and Cronin et al. When the 
subject received no food, they rarely pulled either tool 
(5–21% of trials) and exhibited no preferential pulling 
for the partner. Though common marmosets show gen-
erous behavior, it does not generalize to other coopera-
tively breeding callitrichid species. This combined with 
the data on the non-cooperatively breeding capuchins 
(de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos 
2008) suggests that cooperative breeding is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient as an explanation of other-regard-
ing preferences. 
These data add to the currently conflicted state of 
studies on other-regarding preferences in primates 
(Yamamoto and Tanaka 2009). Humans, marmosets, 
and capuchins demonstrate other-regarding prefer-
ences, (Burkart et al. 2007; de Waal et al. 2008; Fehr et 
al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008), but tam-
arins do not. To further complicate the situation, chim-
panzees show preferences in some situations (Warneken 
et al. 2007; Warneken and Tomasello 2006) but not oth-
ers (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk et al. 2008). 
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What underlies this variation? One obvious factor that 
could play an important role is food (Yamamoto and 
Tanaka 2009). Anecdotally for the tamarins, it appeared 
as though the presence of food for themselves pre-
vented them from even attending to the payoffs for the 
partner. Yet, Lakshminarayanan and Santos found that 
capuchins preferentially gave food to partners even in 
the presence of food for themselves, so they clearly at-
tended to the payoffs of their partner. Burkart et al. 
did not offer food to the marmoset subjects expressly 
to avoid the motivational problem of focusing on food 
for self and not attending to the food for others. Never-
theless, in the present experiment, even when the tam-
arins received no food for themselves and thus could 
not be distracted by this (Other Only trials), they rarely 
pulled at all and if they did pull, they did not differen-
tiate between giving food to or withholding food from 
a partner. Though food may be important, it does not 
completely explain the pattern of data seen in primates. 
Presenting non-food rewards may, however, be use-
ful in testing other-regarding preferences. The cases in 
which chimpanzees seem to show other-regarding pref-
erences, for instance, are those in which they offer tar-
geted helping rather than food (Warneken et al. 2007; 
Warneken and Tomasello 2006). Thus, testing non-food 
rewards may offer more instances of other-regarding 
preferences in primates. 
In addition to food payoffs, the relationship with the 
partner could be quite relevant to other-regarding pref-
erences. Though de Waal et al. (2008) found differences 
in donation rates for kin, nonkin, and strangers in ca-
puchins, the data presented here, along with Burkart et 
al. (2007) and Cronin et al. (2009), suggest that tamarins 
and marmosets do not show differences between kin, 
nonkin, and mates. Takimoto et al. (2009) found differ-
ences for subordinates and dominants in capuchins, but 
this has not been tested in callitrichids. 
One concern regarding the existing data on primate 
other-regarding preferences is the effect sizes of pref-
erences. The marmosets in Burkart et al. (2007), for in-
stance, only pulled for the partners in around 55–60% of 
the trials, and the capuchins pulled in 62 and 62–66% of 
the trials, respectively, in Lakshminarayanan and Santos 
(2008) and de Waal et al. (2008). The Jensen et al. (2006) 
results demonstrate the highest departure from chance 
performance of 50% (Table 1), but, critically, there is no 
difference between partner present and absent condi-
tions in that experiment. For the experiments with pos-
itive results, the mean difference between partner pres-
ent and partner absent conditions was 10–20 and 8%, 
respectively, for Burkhart et al. and Lakshminarayanan 
and Santos (de Waal et al. did not include a partner ab-
sent condition—see Table 1). Though these overall do-
nation rates and mean differences reach statistical sig-
nificance, the effect is not as strong as one might expect 
if these species have a strong preference to help others: 
the biological significance of other-regarding prefer-
ences remains unclear. 
Studies on other species demonstrate higher lev-
els of no-cost donation. The blue jays playing a cooper-
ative game donated food to their partner in about 74% 
of their trials (Stevens and Stephens 2004). Though they 
appear more cooperative than the primates tested so far, 
the methodology differs in the blue jay experiment. Both 
blue jay subjects made cooperative choices repeatedly, 
allowing cooperation contingent on their partner’s be-
havior. The jays, in fact, did cooperate more often fol-
lowing their partner’s cooperation than following de-
fection. This potential element of reciprocity may have 
facilitated donation. Fehr et al. (2008) conducted an ex-
periment on human children based on the primate ex-
perimental design. They showed that 3–6 year olds do-
nated at rates around 60% (comparable to what we see 
with the primates), but 7–8 year olds donated in 78% 
of trials, a clear demonstration of other-regarding pref-
erences. Though not defined in the literature, I propose 
that other-regarding preferences should require a rela-
tively high donation rate and consistent effects across 
individuals. Unfortunately, Burkhart et al. (2007) and de 
Waal et al. (2008) do not present individual data. Stud-
Table 2. Individual pulling rates and number of trials for select conditions 
Subject Sex Total pulling     Preferential pullinga 
  Partner Absent/Barrier  Partner Present   Partner Present  Partner Present  
  (Other Only)  (Other Only)   (Other Only)  (Self and Other)    
  Non-cagemate Mate Non-cagemate Mate Non-cagemate Mate Non-cagemate Mate
EN F 0.11 (44) 0.11 (57) 0.18 (40) 0.20 (40) 0.43 (40) 0.38 (40) 0.55 (80) 0.61 (80)
ID M 0.22 (48) 0.03 (52) 0.13 (40) 0.08 (40) 0.20 (40) 0.33 (40) 0.51 (80) 0.58 (80)
PB M 0.00 (40) 0.03 (40) 0.03 (40) 0.00 (40) 1.00 (40) NA (40) 0.54 (80) 0.59 (80)
RB F 0.12 (101) 0.05 (57) 0.40 (40) 0.22 (37) 0.69 (40) 0.22 (37) 0.49 (80) 0.49 (77)
SH F 0.03 (48) 0.06 (36) 0.33 (40) 0.19 (42) 0.46 (40) 0.50 (42) 0.43 (80) 0.49 (78)
Mean   0.10 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.56 0.36 0.50 0.55 
a. Preferential pulling for partner in trials in which the subjects pulled one of the two tools 
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ies that do present individual data (Cronin et al. 2009; 
Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Vonk et al. 2008) 
demonstrate high variability across subjects, with most 
subjects showing no differences between partner pres-
ent and absent conditions (see also Table 2). In the ab-
sence of high donation rates and inter-individual con-
sistency, perhaps these effects are more aptly labeled 
“other-regarding biases”. 
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